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IPv6 and Firewall traversal



On Wed, Mar 30, 2011 at 10:33 AM, Richard Pieri <Richard.Pieri-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w at public.gmane.org>wrote:

>
> Anyone who relies on NAT for security has almost no network security (see:
> source IP spoofing).  NAT is not, and never has been, about security.  It
> exists to address the limited address space in IPv4 but it is not formally
> part of IPv4.  NAT is, ultimately, a clever hack used to link non-routable
> networks to routable networks.
>
> IPv6 removes this necessity.  Thus, no NAT for IPv6.  And hopefully there
> never will be.  IPv6 has link-local and site-local addressing, which
> eliminates the need for segregating non-routable networks.  This is built
> into the specification.  For everything else there is SPI.
>


Agreed, NAT is not a required ingredient for an effective firewall. Apples
and oranges. It does, however, provide source obfuscation for individual
machines on a LAN, and there is some value in that. For example, I suspect
if it weren't for NAT, consumers would be paying their ISPs "per-node"
connection fees. If things move in that direction in a mostly-IPv6 world, we
could see a resurgence of NAT.





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