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CERT Advisory CA-2001-11



Why are these coming to discuss at Blu.org?
I get CERTs e-mail allready as well as about 10 others...

 -Kris

On Tue, 8 May 2001, Brian Bay wrote:

> CERT Advisory CA-2001-11 sadmind/IIS Worm
>
>    Original release date: May 08, 2001
>    Last revised: --
>    Source: CERT/CC
>
>    A complete revision history is at the end of this file.
>
> Systems Affected
>
>      * Systems running unpatched versions of Microsoft IIS
>      * Systems running unpatched versions of Solaris up to, and
>        including, Solaris 7
>
> Overview
>
>    The CERT/CC has received reports of a new piece of
> self-propagating
>    malicious code (referred to here as the sadmind/IIS worm). The
> worm
>    uses two well-known vulnerabilities to compromise systems and
> deface
>    web pages.
>
> I. Description
>
>    Based on preliminary analysis, the sadmind/IIS worm exploits a
>    vulnerability in Solaris systems and subsequently installs
> software to
>    attack Microsoft IIS web servers. In addition, it includes a
> component
>    to propagate itself automatically to other vulnerable Solaris
> systems.
>    It will add "+ +" to the .rhosts file in the root user's home
>    directory. Finally, it will modify the index.html on the host
> Solaris
>    system after compromising 2,000 IIS systems.
>
>    To compromise the Solaris systems, the worm takes advantage of
> a
>    two-year-old buffer overflow vulnerability in the Solstice
> sadmind
>    program. For more information on this vulnerability, see
>
>           http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/28934
>           http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-1999-16.html
>
>    After successfully compromising the Solaris systems, it uses a
>    seven-month-old vulnerability to compromise the IIS systems.
> For
>    additional information about this vulnerability, see
>
>           http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/111677
>
>    Solaris systems that are successfully compromised via the worm
> exhibit
>    the following characteristics:
>
>      *
> Sample syslog entry from compromised Solaris system
>
> May  7 02:40:01 carrier.domain.com inetd[139]: /usr/sbin/sadmind:
> Bus Error - c
> ore dumped
> May  7 02:40:01 carrier.domain.com last message repeated 1 time
> May  7 02:40:03 carrier.domain.com last message repeated 1 time
> May  7 02:40:06 carrier.domain.com inetd[139]: /usr/sbin/sadmind:
> Segmentation
> Fault - core dumped
> May  7 02:40:03 carrier.domain.com last message repeated 1 time
> May  7 02:40:06 carrier.domain.com inetd[139]: /usr/sbin/sadmind:
> Segmentation
> Fault - core dumped
> May  7 02:40:08 carrier.domain.com inetd[139]: /usr/sbin/sadmind:
> Hangup
> May  7 02:40:08 carrier.domain.com last message repeated 1 time
> May  7 02:44:14 carrier.domain.com inetd[139]: /usr/sbin/sadmind:
> Killed
>      * A rootshell listening on TCP port 600
>      * Existence of the directories
>
>      * /dev/cub contains logs of compromised machines
>      * /dev/cuc contains tools that the worm uses to operate and
>        propagate
>
>      Running processes of the scripts associated with the worm,
> such as
>    the following:
>      * /bin/sh /dev/cuc/sadmin.sh
>      * /dev/cuc/grabbb -t 3 -a .yyy.yyy -b .xxx.xxx 111
>      * /dev/cuc/grabbb -t 3 -a .yyy.yyy -b .xxx.xxx 80
>      * /bin/sh /dev/cuc/uniattack.sh
>      * /bin/sh /dev/cuc/time.sh
>      * /usr/sbin/inetd -s /tmp/.f
>      * /bin/sleep 300
>
>    Microsoft IIS servers that are successfully compromised
> exhibit the
>    following characteristics:
>
>      * Modified web pages that read as follows:
>                             fuck USA Government
>                                fuck PoizonBOx
>                        contact:sysadmcn at yahoo.com.cn
>      *
> Sample Log from Attacked IIS Server
>
> 2001-05-06 12:20:19 10.10.10.10 - 10.20.20.20 80 \
>            GET /scripts/../../winnt/system32/cmd.exe /c+dir 200 -
> 2001-05-06 12:20:19 10.10.10.10 - 10.20.20.20 80 \
>            GET /scripts/../../winnt/system32/cmd.exe /c+dir+..\
> 200 -
> 2001-05-06 12:20:19 10.10.10.10 - 10.20.20.20 80 \
>            GET /scripts/../../winnt/system32/cmd.exe \
>            /c+copy+\winnt\system32\cmd.exe+root.exe 502 -
> 2001-05-06 12:20:19 10.10.10.10 - 10.20.20.20 80 \
>            GET /scripts/root.exe /c+echo+\
>            <HTML code inserted here>.././index.asp 502 -
>
> II. Impact
>
>    Solaris systems compromised by this worm are being used to
> scan and
>    compromise other Solaris and IIS systems. IIS systems
> compromised by
>    this worm can suffer modified web content.
>
>    Intruders can use the vulnerabilities exploited by this worm
> to
>    execute arbitrary code with root privileges on vulnerable
> Solaris
>    systems, and arbitrary commands with the privileges of the
>    IUSR_machinename account on vulnerable Windows systems.
>
>    We are receiving reports of other activity, including one
> report of
>    files being destroyed on the compromised Windows machine,
> rendering
>    them unbootable. It is unclear at this time if this activity
> is
>    directly related to this worm.
>
> III. Solutions
>
> Apply a patch from your vendor
>
>    A patch is available from Microsoft at
>
>
> http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS00-078.asp
>
>           For IIS Version 4:
>
> http://www.microsoft.com/ntserver/nts/downloads/critical/q26986
>           2/default.asp
>
>           For IIS Version 5:
>
> http://www.microsoft.com/windows2000/downloads/critical/q269862
>           /default.asp
>
>    Additional advice on securing IIS web servers is available
> from
>
>           http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/iis5chk.asp
>           http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/tools.asp
>
>    Apply a patch from Sun Microsystems as described in Sun
> Security
>    Bulletin #00191:
>
>
> http://sunsolve.sun.com/pub-cgi/retrieve.pl?doctype=coll&doc=se
>           cbull/191&type=0&nav=sec.sba
>
> Appendix A. Vendor Information
>
> Microsoft Corporation
>
>    The following documents regarding this vulnerability are
> available
>    from Microsoft:
>
>
> http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS01-023.asp
>
> Sun Microsystems
>
>    Sun has issued the following bulletin for this vulnerability:
>
>
> http://sunsolve.sun.com/pub-cgi/retrieve.pl?doctype=coll&doc=se
>           cbull/191&type=0&nav=sec.sba
>
> References
>
>     1. Vulnerability Note VU#111677: Microsoft IIS 4.0 / 5.0
> vulnerable
>        to directory traversal via extended unicode in url
> (MS00-078)
>        http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/111677
>     2. CERT Advisory CA-1999-16 Buffer Overflow in Sun Solstice
>        AdminSuite Daemon sadmind
>        http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-1999-16.html
>
>    Authors:  Chad Dougherty, Shawn Hernan, Jeff Havrilla, Jeff
> Carpenter,
>    Art Manion, Ian Finlay, John Shaffer
>
> ______________________________________________________________________
>
>    This document is available from:
>    http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-11.html
>
> ______________________________________________________________________
>
> CERT/CC Contact Information
>
>    Email: cert at cert.org
>           Phone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
>           Fax: +1 412-268-6989
>           Postal address:
>           CERT Coordination Center
>           Software Engineering Institute
>           Carnegie Mellon University
>           Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890
>           U.S.A.
>
>    CERT personnel answer the hotline 08:00-20:00 EST(GMT-5) /
> EDT(GMT-4)
>    Monday through Friday; they are on call for emergencies during
> other
>    hours, on U.S. holidays, and on weekends.
>
>     Using encryption
>
>    We strongly urge you to encrypt sensitive information sent by
> email.
>    Our public PGP key is available from
>
>    http://www.cert.org/CERT_PGP.key
>
>    If you prefer to use DES, please call the CERT hotline for
> more
>    information.
>
>     Getting security information
>
>    CERT publications and other security information are available
> from
>    our web site
>
>    http://www.cert.org/
>
>    To subscribe to the CERT mailing list for advisories and
> bulletins,
>    send email to majordomo at cert.org. Please include in the body
> of your
>    message
>
>    subscribe cert-advisory
>
>    * "CERT" and "CERT Coordination Center" are registered in the
> U.S.
>    Patent and Trademark Office.
>
> ______________________________________________________________________
>
>    NO WARRANTY
>    Any material furnished by Carnegie Mellon University and the
> Software
>    Engineering Institute is furnished on an "as is" basis.
> Carnegie
>    Mellon University makes no warranties of any kind, either
> expressed or
>    implied as to any matter including, but not limited to,
> warranty of
>    fitness for a particular purpose or merchantability,
> exclusivity or
>    results obtained from use of the material. Carnegie Mellon
> University
>    does not make any warranty of any kind with respect to freedom
> from
>    patent, trademark, or copyright infringement.
>
> _________________________________________________________________
>
>    Conditions for use, disclaimers, and sponsorship information
>
>    Copyright 2001 Carnegie Mellon University.
>
>    Revision History
> May 08, 2001: Initial Release
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> gpg: Warning: using insecure memory!
> gpg: Signature made Tue 08 May 2001 12:46:36 AM EDT using RSA key ID 20B19259
> gpg: Can't check signature: public key not found
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>

-- 


Kris Loranger
kris at kancer.978.org
IRC:undernet,#978,Kancer AIM:KancerKris
"If you're going to sell out, sell out ethically" -Moby

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